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Abstract
Based on an in-depth, qualitative case study about a conflict between govern-
mental authorities from the United States and Switzerland over the regulation
of Swiss banks, we introduce indirect compellence as a novel triadic and indi-
rect mechanism through which coercion leads to institutional change. Hostage-
taking being a prototypical example, indirect compellence is typified by a coer-
cive actor who takes a third party hostage to gain influence over a targeted
actor. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (coercers) compelled Swiss
policy makers (targets) to erode the famed Swiss banking secrecy rules by
threatening the targets to otherwise enforce U.S. law extraterritorially against
Swiss banks and bankers (hostages). Our constructivist and target-centered
perspective explains this type of coercive pressure in detail, and it also sug-
gests that targeted policy makers judge and respond to it contingent on their
political ideologies. Our study contributes to research on power and influence
in institutional environments and to research on global business regulation and
transnational governance. Most generally, it also expands scholarly understand-
ing of triadic relationships. In contrast to Simmelian perspectives’ focus on
triads in which the third party is in a powerful brokerage position and frequently
benefits as a tertius gaudens, our study suggests that the third party can also
become a rather powerless tertius miserabilis who suffers rather than benefits
from others’ conflict.
Keywords: coercion, institutional theory, resource dependence, triadic rela-
tionships, brokerage, global business regulation, transnational governance,
extraterritoriality, constructivism, political ideologies
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A wealth of scholarship at the intersection of resource dependence and institu-
tional theories has focused on the question of why and under what conditions
‘‘international coercion’’ leads to changes in national institutions, such as gov-
ernmental policies or regulations (e.g., Dobbin, Simmons, and Geoffrey, 2007;
Djelic and Quack, 2008; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn, 2009; Guille´n and Capron,
2016). International coercion is understood to include coercers who are foreign
actors such as representatives of transnational organizations or of other coun-
tries (Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005; Polillo and Guille´n, 2005). Generally,
coercion is an influence mechanism (Lawrence, 2008) based on the communi-
cation of a threat (Anderson, 2011): a targeted actor (B) is induced to comply
with the demands of a coercer (A) as a result of A’s threat to otherwise sanc-
tion B by withholding or withdrawing resources on which B depends (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). But under what conditions can A
coerce B to comply with A’s demands when B is not dependent on A’s
resources?
Addressing this question, a few studies have explored ‘‘indirect coercion’’ as
an additional influencing mechanism (e.g., Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Henisz,
Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005). In this case, a third party (C) enables A to increase
its coercive power by providing A with additional resources to strengthen its
hand vis-a`-vis B or by putting additional pressure on B to comply with A’s
demands. Indirect coercion, however, which implies a shift from a dyadic to a
triadic relationship, has remained an under-researched mechanism (Henisz,
Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005). This is an important gap because indirect coercion
can be observed not only in the international realm but also domestically
(Ozcan and Gurses, 2018), and it is employed not only by governmental actors
but also by social movements and other actors in order to change national insti-
tutions, industry-level institutions, or corporate policies and practices (e.g.,
Frooman, 1999; King and Soule, 2007; Sine and Lee, 2009).
Georg Simmel (1950) has provided generations of scholars with foundations
for conceptualizing influence in triadic relationships (Wang and Polillo, 2016).
This research focuses on triadic relationships in which the third party, often-
times referred to as a ‘‘broker’’ (Burt, 1995; Obstfeld, 2005; Obstfeld, Borgatti,
and Davis, 2014; Halevy, Halali, and Zlatev, 2019), is able to powerfully influ-
ence and shape the interactions between the two other actors in the triad
(Simmel, 1950; Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005). This type of third party
derives its influence from its presumed ‘‘equally independent’’ position vis-a`-vis
the two other actors who are in turn assumed to be dependent on it (Simmel,
1950: 159). In research on indirect coercion, this premise is manifest since not
only the target (who the third party can pressure by withholding or withdrawing
needed resources) but also the coercer (who the third party can empower with
needed resources) is considered to be reliant on the resources of the third
party (e.g., Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005).1 It is assumed that its indepen-
dence provides this type of third party with the opportunity to become a tertius
gaudens who benefits from the others’ dependence and who can thus ‘‘make
1 Hence, and in contrast to what much research on brokerage (e.g., Burt, 1995) suggests, the
example of indirect coercion shows that ‘‘brokering does not [necessarily] require the absence of
preexisting ties between alters. Thus it may occur in a closed triad—when alters have preexisting
positive or negative relations (A and B have a preexisting negative, conflict-laden relation in the case
of indirect coercion), as well as in an open triad—when the two alters are connected only through
the broker’’ (Halevy, Halali, and Zlatev, 2019: 6).
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the severest conditions for [providing its] support’’ (Simmel, 1950: 157; Henisz,
Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005). An overreliance on Simmel’s work (1950), however,
has led to a narrow conceptualization of triadic relationships, neglecting constel-
lations in which the third party is less powerful.
Based on our qualitative case study on the erosion of the Swiss banking
secrecy institution, we uncover such a novel type of indirect coercion mechan-
ism in an international institutional environment and explain under which condi-
tions it leads to national institutional change. We studied why it was possible
for U.S. governmental authorities, led by the Department of Justice (DOJ), to
induce changes to the Swiss bank client secrecy rules and to extraterritorially
enforce U.S. bank client transparency rules in Switzerland. Extraterritorial law is
a type of institution for the regulation of multinational enterprises to which the
institutional literature on transnational governance, with its focus on transna-
tional organizations and soft law mechanisms, has as yet paid scant attention
(Fligstein, 2005; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2008; Bartley, 2018; Djelic and Quack,
2018). Extraterritorial jurisdiction is understood as a principle that authorizes
national courts and governmental authorities to legally enforce national institu-
tions abroad should foreign private actors such as companies and their employ-
ees (here Swiss banks and bankers) be found to transgress these national
institutions in another country (Putnam, 2009). While Swiss bank client secrecy
rules constituted a barrier to the enforcement of U.S. demands for bank client
transparency because they legally prohibited Swiss banks from delivering the
requested bank client data to U.S. authorities, the DOJ (as a coercer) repeat-
edly managed to induce Swiss policy makers (as targets) to change Swiss
banking secrecy in ways that accommodated the coercer’s institutional
demands.
We refer to the indirect coercion mechanism that induced Swiss policy mak-
ers to change the banking secrecy institution as indirect compellence.2 Similar
mechanisms have been addressed in armed conflict research (Smetana and
Ludvik, 2019; see also Schelling, 1966; Harkavy, 1998; Honneland, 1998;
Carter, 2015) and in particular in research on hostage-taking, which can be con-
sidered the prototypical example of indirect compellence (see, e.g., Antokol
and Nudell, 1990; Buhite, 1995; Allen, 2006).3 Hence indirect compellence
means that a coercer (A, henceforth referred to as hostage taker) instrumen-
tally uses a third party (C, henceforth referred to as hostage) as a resource to
increase its coercive power over the target (B) (Borowsky, 2011). More specifi-
cally, it implies that A threatens B to sanction C unless B complies with A’s
demands. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (A), with the DOJ at the
forefront, sought to gain compliance with their institutionalized demands from
targeted Swiss policy makers (B) by threatening the policy makers with legal
sanctions against Swiss banks and bankers (C) and by selectively sanctioning a
number of these in order to intimidate their targets.
The type of third party found in the indirect compellence scenario is the
opposite of the powerful broker that the Simmelian literature on power and
2 In doing so we build on Schelling’s (1966) influential distinction between two types of coercive
threats: deterrence, which intends no change in the target’s behavior, and compellence, which
intends the exact opposite, i.e., change in the target’s behavior and in the institutional status quo.
3 Hostage-taking is an established practice in international relations (Allen, 2006). While in recent
decades it has received connotations of terrorism and criminal acts (Buhite, 1995), we employ the
term in the former, more general sense.
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influence in the triad presumes. Rather than being independent from the other
two actors in the triad (Simmel, 1950; Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n, 2005), the
hostage is dependent on both the hostage taker (who can sanction it) and the
target (who can contribute to the hostage’s release from its ‘‘miserable’’ posi-
tion by complying with the hostage taker’s demands). Rather than having the
potential to become a tertius gaudens and benefit from the conflict of the two
other actors (Simmel, 1950), the hostage is in the position of a tertius miser-
abilis, i.e., a third who suffers from it (Scharmann, 1959).
This paper develops theory on the conditions under which indirect compel-
lence leads to national institutional change. We adopt a constructivist approach
to coercion that rests on two assumptions (Bell, 2012; Bell and Hindmoor,
2015). First, coercion is best understood from the perspective of the target
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005). It is the targets (rather than the hostage takers or
the hostages) and how they interpret and respond to coercive pressure that
ultimately determine whether institutional change comes about. Second, policy
makers’ interpretations of environmental signals are not unmediated—as
realist and rational choice perspectives presume—but are filtered by estab-
lished and codified ideas such as political ideologies (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1999;
Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Political ideologies are policy makers’ taken-for-
granted beliefs about how the social world operates (Campbell, 1998; Hay,
2006; Wang, Du, and Marquis, 2018), ‘‘including ideas about what outcomes
are desirable and how they can best be achieved’’ (Simons and Ingram, 1997:
784). Our case suggests that in parliamentary democracies, targeted policy
makers are not unitary actors but heterogeneous collectives who, depending
on their political ideologies, attach differential degrees of importance to the
hostages threatened by the hostage takers and to the national institution that
hostage takers seek to erode. Consequently, their willingness to comply with
the hostage takers’ demands in order to release the hostages from their tertius
miserabilis position may vary.
RESEARCH SETTING
We studied how the U.S. Qualified Intermediary Program (QIP) and its extrater-
ritorial enforcement by the U.S. DOJ led to an erosion of Swiss banking
secrecy and, respectively, to the compliance of targeted Swiss state leaders
and policy makers with the DOJ’s institutional demands for bank client trans-
parency. Both the QIP and Swiss banking secrecy are legal institutions (Scott,
2007). Their underlying cultural models are thus buttressed by ‘‘the force of
law and government mandate[s]’’ (Oliver, 1991: 168).
Swiss Banking Secrecy and the Swiss Government (the ‘‘Targets’’)
Swiss banking secrecy. In the nineteenth century, banking secrecy
became a widely shared professional norm and was formalized, becoming a
Swiss national law in 1934 (Guex, 2000). Emphasizing the merits of privacy,
the legislation made it the duty of Swiss banks to protect any information
gained in transacting with their clients and stipulated severe punishment for
the disclosure of bank account information (Aubert, Kernen, and Scho¨nle,
1982). For foreign citizens, besides protecting their privacy, this provided an
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opportunity to evade taxes in their home countries. Estimates suggest that in
2008, 800 billion Swiss Francs in ‘‘black money’’ were placed in Swiss bank
accounts (Swiss newspaper Handelszeitung, 2014).4
Switzerland had bilateral agreements in place with most countries, including
the U.S. Switzerland does not regard ‘‘tax evasion’’ as a criminal offense; only
‘‘tax fraud’’ as defined in Swiss Federal Tax Law (DBG) is subject to prosecu-
tion with up to three years imprisonment or fines. This distinction is a feature
of the Swiss tax law. Tax evasion is considered a minor offense subject to
administrative penalties, such as when the taxpayer fails ‘‘to declare certain
income or assets in his tax return’’ (Aubert, 1984: 280; Art. 175 I DBG). In con-
trast, tax fraud means deceiving tax authorities by submitting false, forged, or
untrue documents such as accounting records, balance sheets, profit and loss
statements or payslips and other documents of third parties for the purpose of
avoiding the payment of tax (Aubert, 1984; Art.186 I DGB). Consequently, in
line with the double litigation principle, the bilateral agreements foresaw that
Swiss authorities would provide foreign authorities with legal assistance in the
prosecution of suspects only in cases of alleged tax fraud (not tax evasion), and
then only for individual suspects (not for groups of suspects) and only after
foreign authorities had delivered sufficient evidence (not merely suspicion) of
wrongdoing. This has made the prosecution of tax cheats extremely difficult
for foreign authorities.
The Swiss authorities. Within the time frame of our study, the Swiss
authorities were not a homogeneous actor but consisted of representatives
from seven political parties in the case of the Nationalrat (the federal parliament
and legislative body) and five political parties in the case of the Bundesrat or
‘‘Federal Council,’’ a seven-member collective that serves as the federal gov-
ernment and head of the executive body. Table 1 shows the makeup of the
Swiss government in terms of political parties.
Of the seven political parties in Switzerland, only the two Socialist parties
(SP and GDP) opposed Swiss banking secrecy. Following from their socialist
ideology, they strived for national and international justice (Jackson, 2014) and
expressed disdain for benefiting at the expense of others. Already in 1984, the
Socialist Party (SP) had launched a referendum against banking secrecy. Even
though the Swiss people rejected the proposal, the SP continued to advocate
that the law be repealed (Swiss National Broadcasting Agency, 18 Dec. 2017).
Moreover, from the early 1990s onward, members of the SP suggested that
the pressure on banking secrecy from abroad would grow, resulting in negative
consequences for Switzerland (e.g., Ziegler, 1992). They thus called for more
extensive forms of international collaboration in fighting tax evasion, including
the automatic exchange of information between domestic and foreign tax
authorities as advocated by the OECD and the large EU countries.
All the other parties strongly supported Swiss banking secrecy. The parties
with a business-friendly neoliberal ideology (FDP, GLP, CVP, BDP) (see
4 800 billion Swiss francs equal ca. 794 billion USD (rate of exchange on 10 May 2019). In this sec-
tion we document our discussion of the setting with data sources described in the Methods section
but abbreviated here for convenience, including the GPK, an investigating commission of the Swiss
parliament, and the Swiss newspapers Neue Zu¨richer Zeitung (NZZ), Finanz & Wirtschaft (FW), and
Tagesanzeiger (TA).
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Centeno and Cohen, 2012) saw Swiss banking secrecy as important for the
protection of individual citizens from too much state interference. Moreover,
they regarded the institution as highly beneficial for the Swiss financial sector
and the Swiss economy. Policy makers from the SVP, with its nationalist ideol-
ogy (see Vincent, 2014), emphasized the concept of banking secrecy as an
important symbol of Switzerland’s sovereignty. The SVP even launched
repeated attempts to enshrine banking secrecy in the Swiss constitution.
Even though the banking secrecy institution faced repeated challenges from
other foreign authorities (in particular from Germany, France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom) or international organizations (such as the OECD) (e.g.,
OECD, 1998; NZZ, 21 June 2000; NZZ, 22 Sept. 2001; NZZ, 14 April 2002;
NZZ, 1 March 2008), the majority of Swiss policy makers strongly rejected their
demands. Backed by the Swiss banks, who strongly supported this institution,
and for whom the institution implied a competitive advantage over banks from
countries lacking such a rule, any demands to abandon banking secrecy were
fiercely fended off.
The Swiss Banks (the ‘‘Hostages’’)
In addition to chocolate and watches, Switzerland is frequently associated with
banks. They have a high cultural and economic significance for the country, and
Table 1. Political Parties in the Swiss Government
Swiss political parties* Swiss federal parliament (%) Swiss federal councilors (No.)`
Socialist parties 27.1 2
Socialist Party (SP) 18.7
Green Democratic Party (GDP) 8.4
Neoliberal parties 38.2 4
Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) 15.1
Christian People’s Party (CVP) 12.3
Civic Democratic Party (BDP) 5.4
Green Liberal Party (GLP) 5.4
Nationalist party 26.6 1
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 26.6
Other 8.1
Total 100 7
* This table lists the ideological orientation of Swiss parties according to both Swiss political scientists (e.g.,
Hermann and Leuthold, 2003; Vatter, 2016) and long-term annual analyses of the parties’ programs by Swiss
election research institutes (e.g., sotomo) (see, e.g., TA, 18 Apr. 2015, for an overview).

Composition as of the Swiss parliamentary elections of 2011. In the federal elections Switzerland has a
proportional representation; thus Swiss parties are represented in the Swiss federal parliament (Nationalrat) in
proportion to their election results.
`
The seven Federal Councilors (Bundesra¨te) are elected individually for a four-year tenure by the Swiss parliament.
The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is the head of the federal administration and is formed by the seven Federal
Councilors who govern as a collective. The role of the Swiss president (Bundespra¨sident) is a primus inter pares
role, largely with representative functions, and rotates annually among the seven councilors following a seniority
sequence.
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many refer to the banking sector as the ‘‘state within the state’’ (e.g., Trepp,
1999). In 2009, the banking sector had close to 300 bank companies with
135,900 employees and contributed about 7 percent to Switzerland’s gross
domestic product (GDP).
In our study, three types of Swiss banks are of interest. First, the two large,
multinational banking corporations UBS and Credit Suisse offer all types of
banking services. Both banks are represented in over 50 countries with branch
offices and subsidiaries. Both are among the largest banks in the world: the
total commitment of each exceeded 150 percent of Switzerland’s GDP (FW, 4
Sept. 2015).5 Second, the cantonal banks are mostly active in all business
areas, and most of them are publicly owned and have a state guarantee. Third,
the private banks are organized as individual companies, collective and limited
partnerships. Compared with the two other groups, they have a minor impact
on the Swiss economy.
Swiss banks, which manage around USD 2.200 billion in cross-border private
banking assets, are global leaders in cross-border private wealth management.
Together, in 2009, they held a global market share of 26 percent according to
the Swiss Bankers Association. All three types of banks offer this service: UBS
was the leading global provider, and the private banks tend to specialize in this
domain. Responding to bank clients’ concerns for privacy and protecting their
assets against information disclosure, banking secrecy was particularly impor-
tant for private wealth management. To ensure that banking secrecy would
protect all client data from interventions by foreign authorities, all Swiss banks
stored the data on servers in Switzerland.
The U.S. Qualified Intermediary Program (QIP) and the U.S. Authorities
(the ‘‘Hostage Takers’’)
The QIP. Devised by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the QIP was
introduced in the U.S. in 2000 to increase tax compliance. It involved a contract
that the United States entered into directly with foreign banks (GPK, 3241–
3243). Foreign banks that obtained a ‘‘qualified intermediary’’ (QI) status
became the ‘‘long arm of U.S. law enforcement authorities’’ (GPK, 3242). They
became responsible for, first, sharing information with the IRS about U.S. citi-
zens with beneficial interests in U.S. securities and, second, ensuring the
appropriate withholding of tax on U.S. securities held by non-U.S. citizens. A
majority of banks throughout the world chose to become a QI, including virtu-
ally every Swiss bank (Emmenegger, 2015). The Swiss government did not
regard the QI agreement as a violation of banking secrecy. First, Swiss banks
were allowed to keep the names of non-U.S. persons with U.S. securities con-
fidential and transfer the withholding tax as an aggregate amount, and second,
it ‘‘left U.S. clients of Swiss banks the choice between giving up banking
secrecy and forgoing the right to invest in U.S. securities’’ (Emmenegger,
2015: 11).
The QIP is a specific type of transnational governance institution, namely,
extraterritorial law, which has largely been neglected by institutional scholars
despite its increasing importance in transnational issues such as fighting
5 The total commitment equals the balance sheet total plus off-balance-sheet liabilities.
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corruption, organized crime, product piracy, or terrorism (see, e.g., Colangelo,
2011; Kaczmarek and Newman, 2011; Gardner, 2015). Extraterritorial law is
about the application and enforcement of national laws against individual or
corporate actors located outside the nation’s territory. In such cases, judicial
assertions actively project national legal norms into the transnational realm,
thus making the law a transnational institution (see Putnam, 2009: 468).
Extraterritorial law differs greatly from other, more thoroughly investigated
types of transnational governance mechanisms.
First, as extraterritorial law, the QIP is based on ‘‘hard law’’ (Abbott and
Snidal, 2000). Hard law, as distinguished from ‘‘soft law,’’ is characterized by
three properties: (a) it is precise in specifying ‘‘clearly and unambiguously what
is expected’’ of the targeted actors (Abbott et al., 2000: 413), (b) it consists of
rules that are binding in nature and place an obligation on targeted actors, and
(c) it is reinforced by a designated enforcement apparatus that involves courts
and other administrative organizations (Abbott et al., 2000). Hence extraterritor-
ial law enforcement emphasizes the role of legal sanctions, conceived here as
a specific type of resource-based sanctioning (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Short and Toffel, 2010). In cases of business regulation, legal sanctions of
increasing intensity involve public naming and shaming, civil penalties, criminal
penalties, or the revocation of licenses, which effectively represents ‘‘corporate
capital punishment’’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 50; Parker and Braithwaite,
2005). Despite their increasing prevalence (Scott, Levitt, and Orr, 2011), how-
ever, legal sanctions have not been studied in depth in the context of interna-
tional coercion and transnational governance (Dobbin, Simmons, and Geoffrey,
2007; Djelic and Quack, 2008).
Second, while other transnational institutions, such as those advocated
by transnational organizations (e.g., United Nations, International Labor
Organization) or the hard-law institutions advocated by the European
Union, have ‘‘no particular or clear national origin,’’ extraterritorial laws
are hard-law rules from a particular national space (Djelic and Quack, 2008:
308). Extraterritorial jurisdiction has gained in importance in several coun-
tries, with the United States as the most important actor (Putnam, 2009:
468; Kaczmarek and Newman, 2011).
The U.S. authorities. Before 2008, the U.S. law enforcement authorities
had not acted as challengers of Swiss banking secrecy. In summer 2008, this
situation changed following the onset of the financial crisis in which the United
States economy incurred a dramatic decline. In previous years, the OECD and
countries like Germany and France had already campaigned against tax eva-
sion, emphasizing that it drastically undermined the countries’ national tax
base. Following the financial crisis, this issue also entered the political agenda
of the United States. Hence, the two primary U.S. law enforcement authorities
mandated to ensure that U.S. citizens comply with U.S. tax laws—the IRS and
the DOJ—were tasked by the U.S. government, including the G. W. Bush
(2000–2009) and Obama (2009–2016) administrations as well as several U.S.
senators, to prosecute U.S. tax cheats. U.S. authorities aimed to collect needed
funds and wanted to demonstrate that they do not tolerate tax cheats with
foreign accounts—who are typically very affluent—while ordinary citizens are
suffering. Hence, while the U.S. had followed a principle of non-interference
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into foreign tax jurisdictions prior to the financial crisis, now U.S. authorities
were encouraged to act unilaterally and to extraterritorially enforce U.S. law
(Seabrooke and Wigan, 2016).
U.S. authorities such as the DOJ did not have direct coercive power over
the Swiss government. As we will show in detail, however, the alleged trans-
gressions of the QIP by Swiss banks—to which the DOJ was alerted by a
whistleblower—enabled U.S. authorities, and the DOJ in particular, to increase
their coercive power over the Swiss government because the DOJ could threa-
ten to indict, i.e., to formally accuse and sanction Swiss banks and bankers. De
facto, as we will show, an indictment of a Swiss bank jeopardizes the bank’s
existence. Independently of whether the bank would later be found guilty in
court or not, the mere announcement of the indictment caused clients and
other banks to terminate business with the bank, thus leading to its rapid col-
lapse. Threatening to indict Swiss banks, accordingly, enabled the DOJ to indir-
ectly compel the Swiss government to erode Swiss banking secrecy.
METHODS
Data
Our data were collected to cover the period from 2007 to 2015, starting when
a whistleblower, a former employee of the Swiss bank UBS, alerted U.S.
authorities to the potential transgressions of U.S. law by Swiss banks, thereby
leading to the so-called ‘‘tax dispute’’ between U.S. authorities and Swiss
authorities and banks.
We collected data from three types of sources, as shown in table 2—media
data, documentary data, and interviews—thus creating a data set as rich and
reliable as possible. We collected media data by creating a large database of
media reports by sampling articles from major Swiss and international newspa-
pers. These were complemented with television data sourced from the Swiss
National Broadcasting Agency (SRF). We collected a wealth of documentary
data from the U.S. authorities, Swiss authorities and political parties, banks and
banking associations, and other important sources. This included reports, docu-
ments, transcripts, and press releases from U.S. and Swiss governmental
agencies and politicians. Further, we sourced books written by experts and insi-
ders and collected scholarly literature on the case published in various fields.
We complemented our documentary data with 18 retrospective and semi-
structured interviews with informants who were purposefully sampled for their
unique insights into the development of this institutional conflict. We inter-
viewed representatives from Swiss banks, industry experts, and key partici-
pants in the interstate negotiation processes.
Data Analysis
Our purpose was to develop theory inductively (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton,
2013). Our analysis was guided by an interpretive methodology (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998) to capture the subjective meanings that are at the core of the
constructivist perspective (Adler, 1997). We aimed to reconstruct the Swiss
targets’ interpretations, thus focusing on their patterns of argumentation
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010) and how and why
these interpretations were triggered. Although we repeatedly went back and
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Table 2. Data Sources
Amount
(in pages)
Amount total
(in pages)
Media data
Newspaper articles
Swiss newspapers:
Neue Zu¨richer Zeitung (NZZ) 620
Tagesanzeiger (TA) 410
Swissinfo (online news) 229
Finanz & Wirtschaft (FW) 75
Handelszeitung (HZ) 64
Blick 55
Weltwoche (WW) 42 1495
U.S. newspapers:
New York Times (NYT) 193
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 112 305
International newspapers:
Financial Times (FT) 71
The Economist 9 80
Television data (Swiss National Broadcasting Agency, SRF)
2 1-hour documentaries 57
‘‘Arena’’ debates 29 86
Documentary data
Swiss government
Verbatim transcriptions of parliamentary sessions (Episode 2) 75
GPK report* 360
Press releases 10 445
Swiss political parties
Research about Swiss parties and their political ideologies 150
Data by Swiss election research institutes 25
Blog entries of Swiss politicians 11 186
U.S. government
2 reports of Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of U.S. Senate 295
Verbatim transcriptions of PSI hearings (excl. appendices) 97
Press releases by Senator Carl Levine (head of PSI) 40
IRS and DOJ accusation and indictment documents and press releases 108 540
Swiss banks, bankers, and banking associations
Reports and press releases 57
1 biography of Raoul Weil (UBS banker indicted by DOJ) 368 425
Other documentary data
2 books about tax dispute from Swiss experts 541
10 research papers on demise of Swiss banking secrecy from legal scholars and political
scientists
274 815
Interviews
Swiss authorities (3) 31
141
Field-level experts (3) 36
Swiss bankers (12) 74
Total 4518
* A 400-page report on the UBS case from a special investigatory commission of the Swiss parliament (the
Gescha¨ftspru¨fungskommission, GPK). The report provides detailed data on the interactions between the U.S.
authorities and the Swiss government and Swiss banks, and the interpretations by Swiss policy makers.
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forth among data, emergent theoretical ideas, and prior literature, for the sake
of clarity, we describe our analysis as a sequence of three separable steps.
As a first step we developed a narrative account, which enabled us to
synthesize the raw data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We effectively started
the analysis with visual maps of key events (Langley, 1999). With the event
timeline in hand, and drawing on our various data sources, we developed an
increasingly rich and comprehensive description of the overall case. We sys-
tematically extended this narrative by extracting direct and indirect state-
ments of the key players in the overall process from our various data sources
to disclose symbolic actions and interpretations (see Meyer and Hoellerer,
2010).
Second, we bracketed our stream of longitudinal data into separate time
periods (e.g., Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Haydu, 1998). In this process, we
found that the U.S. authorities had actually overcome the Swiss institutional
barriers to the enforcement of the QI agreement twice (in 2009 and 2012). In
each case Swiss authorities had been compelled to comply with the demands
of the U.S. authorities, who thus influenced the erosion of the Swiss banking
secrecy institution. Hence, although we have a single case, the case consists
of a sequence of two embedded sub-cases, henceforth referred to as
‘‘Episode 1’’ and ‘‘Episode 2’’ (see Ozcan and Gurses, 2018, for a similar
approach). Following this, a second, more fine-grained bracketing began as we
came to realize that in the first phase of the two episodes (referred to as
‘‘Episode 1—Phase a’’ and ‘‘Episode 2—Phase a’’), Swiss authorities had
resisted the demands of the U.S. authorities, while in the second phase of
each episode (referred to as ‘‘Episode 1—Phase b’’ and ‘‘Episode 2—Phase b’’)
they complied.
Subsequently we compared and contrasted the two episodes and the four
phases to uncover the factors leading to resistance (in phases a) and compli-
ance (in phases b) (Ozcan and Gurses, 2018). To this end, we systematically
coded our data to develop a data structure that contained codes and themes
that were increasingly aggregated, abstracted, and theoretically informed
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013), as shown in figure 1. We started by devel-
oping first-order codes as close as possible to the empirical dynamics under
investigation to make sense of events. Subsequently, we sought to produce
codes that integrated these first-order codes into a smaller number of more
abstract second-order themes and then to integrate them even further into a
few aggregate dimensions. We developed our theoretical model on the basis
of these concepts. We provide exemplary evidence for our codes in table 3 and
additional evidence in the Online Appendix (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
suppl/10.1177/0001839219855033).
THE CASE STUDY
Below, we present compressed narratives of the two episodes of indirect com-
pellence and institutional change that we identified. As explained above, we
have split each episode into two phases (a and b) to contrast the phases of the
target’s resistance with the phases of the target’s compliance. The case narra-
tives are structured according to our first-order codes.
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Episode 1: Threatening Legal Sanctions against UBS and Effecting a
Breach of Swiss Banking Secrecy (2007–2009)
Based on the revelations of Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS employee and
whistleblower, and beginning in 2007, the DOJ, led by prosecutor Kevin M.
Downing, initiated an investigation into UBS’s alleged transgressions of the
QIP. The QI contained a major loophole: if U.S. clients appeared as foreign legal
entities, they were not subject to information reporting, thus allowing Swiss
banks to continue servicing U.S. clients with an interest in U.S. securities while
respecting both the QIP and the confidentiality requirements of Swiss banking
secrecy (Emmenegger, 2015: 12). UBS had allegedly supported its U.S. clients
in setting up such foreign legal entities, including foreign shell companies and
charitable trusts. The investigation became public in March 2008. While Swiss
banks had repeatedly alerted U.S. authorities in the previous years about this
loophole (e.g., NZZ, 20 Nov. 2008), in 2008, the DOJ argued that the purpose
of foreign legal entities was tax evasion in the UBS case and that they were
thus illegal. UBS was accused of conspiring to defraud the U.S. (DOJ, 18 Feb.
Figure 1. Data structure.
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Table 3. Exemplary Evidence for Codes
Intensity of Indirect Compellence Attempts
Magnitude of indirect threats
Threat to indict UBS:
[During a meeting between the DOJ and Swiss authorities at Zurich Airport on 15 July 2008] ‘‘. . . there is sufficient
evidence to indict the bank. In this context, the DOJ representatives made it clear that it was not their intention to induce
a collapse of the UBS. Yet, they requested broad and unlimited cooperation.’’ (GPK, 3270–3271)
15 Sept. 2008: DOJ e-mail: ‘‘The DOJ was convinced that an indictment of the UBS in the USA would lead to the bank
being convicted.’’ (GPK, 3289–3290).
Threat to indict 12 Swiss banks:
On 8 Dec. 2008 DOJ head investigator Downing informed the Swiss authorities that the global bank [UBS] would be
indicted in the U.S. as a criminal organization if it did not transfer the names and account data of U.S. tax cheats within
the following few weeks. (Ha¨ssig, 2010: 149)
31 Aug. 2011: ‘‘An e-mail arrives in the Swiss Department of Finance from Deputy U.S. Attorney General, James M. Cole.
Together with his boss, Attorney General Eric Holder, he intends to carry out the American threats against Swiss banks.
Cole is extremely clear: if the requested data do not arrive before the indicated deadline, the banks will be indicted.’’
(WW, 28 Sept. 2012)
Substantiation of indirect intimidations
Intimidating messages:
U.S. Senator Levine: ‘‘The documents and testimony that we are releasing today disclose a culture of secrecy and
deception that we are determined to end, despite it being so strongly entrenched.’’ (PSI hearing 2008: 6, 17 July 2008)
‘‘Critical to every investigation of offshore activity is the ability to obtain evidence from a foreign country. . . .
Unfortunately, we do not have co-operative agreements with every country. Moreover, not all co-operative agreements
cover both civil and criminal matters. On occasion, MLATs exclude outright tax crimes altogether, while other MLATs and
tax treaties are limited to particular instances in which we can allege specific kinds of fraud. In such circumstances,
however, we will not be deterred. We will pursue other formal and informal methods of obtaining the foreign evidence
we seek.’’ (PSI hearing 2008: 15, 23, 17 July 2008)
Indictments of selected bankers and banks:
‘‘In a move that could spell bigger trouble for UBS, the indictment [of Raoul Weil] also referred to unindicted co-
conspirators who ‘occupied positions of the highest level of management within the Swiss bank.’’’ (NYT 13 Nov. 2008)
‘‘Wegelin & Company, the oldest Swiss bank, confirmed on Wednesday that three of its employees had been indicted by
prosecutors in New York for helping United States taxpayers to hide more than $1.2 billion from the Internal Revenue
Service.’’ (NYT, 4 Jan. 2012)
Intensity of Compliance Petitions
Status of petitioner
Rank of bank representatives / Size of banks who petition:
10 Dec. 2008: ‘‘. . . Letter by the governing board of UBS. . . . According to a meeting of UBS lawyers and the DOJ, an
indictment of the bank as well as of further members of UBS top management, could be filed before Christmas.’’ (GPK:
3315)
‘‘Also, the representatives of the associations of the Swiss bankers and of the Swiss private banks, of Credit Suisse, Basle
cantonal bank, and of Julius Ba¨r Group have asked the parliamentarians insistently to agree to the amendment.’’ (NZZ, 11
Jan. 2012)
Vividness of petitions
Frequency of petitions:
13 Nov. 2008: ‘‘The indictment of Weil intensified the pressure on UBS, and hence also on Swiss authorities. According to
repeated petitions by UBS representatives, this event showed that the legal assistance pathway had failed.’’ (GPK: 3206)
Between October 2011 and February 2012, CEOs of several Swiss banks as well as top-level representatives of the Swiss
banking associations publish several commentaries in the major Swiss newspapers, including NZZ, Tagesanzeiger, and
others to induce Swiss policymakers to agree to the amendment.
(continued)
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Table 3. (continued)
Intensity of Compliance Petitions (continued)
Emotionality of petitions:
14 Nov. 2008: ‘‘UBS requested backing from the Swiss authorities for the transfer of the data, otherwise the ‘grounding’
of the bank was likely.’’ (GPK: 3315)
‘‘The latest lobbying of the banks does not require many words: ‘It is about the delivery of the U.S. client data. There is no
controversy. It is a question of survival.’ The U.S. authorities have evidence against 11 banks. And in this case, banking
secrecy does not count anymore. The client? Who cares?’’ (TA, 20 Jan. 2012)
Perceived Compellingness of Indirect Threat
Perceived severity of indirect threat
Swiss dependence on survival of threatened banks*:
19 Dec. 2008: ‘‘In the interest of both the Swiss and the global financial system, the Swiss Federal Council requests
FINMA to take all necessary measures to avoid an indictment.’’ (GPK, 3325)
‘‘I am not willing to risk the stability of the financial market for U.S. tax cheats.’’ (Philipp Mu¨ller, FDP, TA, 28 Jan. 2012)
Swiss dependence on maintenance of banking secrecy*:
‘‘We need to consider whether we would not rather let a bank go bust. Switzerland has in the past made too many
concessions to the Americans and sacrificed the banking secrecy too easily.’’ (Ueli Maurer, SVP, TA, 11 Sept. 2011)
‘‘Agreeing to the amendment would weaken the Swiss financial sector. If privacy is no longer protected, clients will
transfer their wealth to other countries.’’ (Caspar Baader, SVP, TA, 21 Dec. 2011)
Perceived credibility of indirect threat
Perceived authorization of U.S. authorities:
Federal Councilor Merz wants to bring the U.S. back onto ‘‘the legal route.’’ (NZZ, 3 July 2008)
‘‘I still consider the USA as a state under the rule of law which does not simply adopt a ‘might is right’ approach toward its
small, but dependable partner.’’ (Maximilian Reimann, SVP, 23 Sept. 2011)
Perceived determination of U.S. authorities:
Federal Councilor Merz: ‘‘The DOJ would not be willing to wait for the outcome of the Swiss legal assistance procedure.’’
(GPK, 3319)
‘‘The threats of the U.S. authorities are real and have to be taken seriously.’’ (Jean-Rene´ Fournier, CVP, parliament, 13
Dec. 2011)
Compliance with Hostage Takers’ Demands
Resistance to hostage takers’ demands
Adherence to legal assistance procedure:
19 Sept. 2008: ‘‘Certain messages should be conveyed to the U.S. authorities unequivocally: One would insist on the
respect for the law of a friendly state and underline the available channels of cooperation.’’ (GPK, 3296)
Postponing decision on amendment:
‘‘Swiss parliament postpones decision of whether or not to amend the bilateral agreement with the United States to the
next session.’’ (Swiss parliament, 23 Sept. 2011)
Compliance with hostage takers’ demands
Authorization of emergency measures:
‘‘Based on articles 25 and 26 of Swiss banking law, the Federal Council has authorized that FINMA transfers data of UBS’
U.S. clients. The purpose was to protect UBS and enable UBS to reach a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S.
Department of Justice.’’ (Press conference of Federal Councilor Hans-Rudolf Merz, 19 Feb. 2009).
Agreeing to amendment:
‘‘Swiss parliament agrees to amend the bilateral agreement with the United States.’’ (Swiss parliament, 16 March 2012)
* As elaborated in the theory development section when detailing the components of this variable, perceptions of
high (low) Swiss dependence on the survival of threatened banks are positively (negatively) related and their
perceptions of high (low) Swiss dependence on the maintenance of banking secrecy are negatively (positively)
related to the targeted policy makers’ perceptions of the severity of an indirect threat.
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2009; PSI, 25 July 2008), and the DOJ requested that UBS immediately trans-
fer the names of U.S. clients who had UBS accounts so that these could be
prosecuted and fined.
The Swiss authorities quickly intervened. They denied the transfer of such
information because the bank client data were protected by the Swiss banking
secrecy act. As they emphasized, the only way forward for the U.S. authorities
was to request administrative assistance. In this procedure Swiss authorities
would analyze the accounts of the U.S. clients of UBS to check for evidence of
tax fraud (as distinguished from tax evasion), in which case data could be trans-
ferred. In August 2008, the DOJ agreed, filing the petition, and consequently
UBS handed the data over to the Swiss authorities for their inspection. The
Swiss administrative assistance pathway, however, was a lengthy process.
According to the double litigation principle, it involved an evaluation of every
single U.S. client of UBS by the Swiss Department of Justice to assess
whether the client had committed tax fraud and not only tax evasion.
According to Rolf Wyss, Deputy Director of the Swiss Federal Office of
Justice, Swiss authorities tried hard to accelerate the legal assistance process
(SRF documentary, 2014). Still, having received some three petitions for legal
assistance on tax matters in the previous years, they were completely over-
whelmed, lacking the resources to process several hundred petitions at once
(SRF documentary, 2014). Moreover, the respective clients were informed that
their data could soon be transferred to the U.S. authorities, and several
responded by filing lawsuits against this decision, causing further delays.
Hence, as late as December 2008, five months after the U.S. authorities had
filed their petition, not a single data file had yet been transferred by the Swiss
authorities.
Episode 1 (Phase a): Targets’ resistance to hostage takers’ institutional
demands. Already in August 2008 DOJ representatives had emphasized that
they considered the legal assistance procedure to be inadequate, because they
wanted the data as quickly as possible. They repeatedly communicated to the
Swiss government the threat to indict UBS if the Swiss government would not
transfer the requested data (GPK, 3270–3271). In October 2008, as no data
files had been transferred, they reiterated their threat to the Swiss authorities
after a meeting in which UBS had been expected to present internal findings to
U.S. authorities. The DOJ then stated that indicting UBS and potentially jeopar-
dizing its existence would not be its intention; rather, its priority would be to
receive the data swiftly so that the U.S. tax evaders could be punished (GPK,
3296). DOJ representatives and other U.S. authorities also mobilized a variety
of intimidating messages to back their threats. Such intimidations included
hearings organized by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of
the U.S. Senate that were broadcast at prime time on Swiss television. PSI offi-
cials, alongside U.S. Senators Carl Levine (Democrat) and Norm Coleman
(Republican), emphasized their determination to ‘‘crack’’ the banking secrecy if
necessary to obtain the data (PSI, 25 July 2008).
In this phase, following the pressure developed by the hostage takers, repre-
sentatives of the UBS legal department approached the Swiss authorities regu-
larly, asking them to handle the legal assistance process swiftly (e.g., GPK,
3299). The bank’s top management was not involved, and the view of UBS
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was that everything was still under control (e.g., Urs Zulauf, vice director,
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, interview).
With regard to the Swiss government, the issue concerned Hans-Rudolf
Merz, head of the Swiss Federal Department of Finance (FDF) and representa-
tive of the neoliberal Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) in the Swiss Federal
Council. He did not regard the threat posed by the U.S. authorities as compel-
ling enough to justify a deviation from the institutional status quo. On one hand,
he regarded the threat as severe: experts from the FDF and from the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) had informed him that an
indictment by the DOJ would jeopardize UBS’s existence and that the bank-
ruptcy of a bank like UBS would have disastrous consequences (SRF documen-
tary, 2014), as it was a systematically important bank on which Switzerland
was dependent (GPK, 3267; Urs Zulauf, interview). On the other hand, Merz
did not regard the threat by the U.S. authorities to indict UBS as sufficiently
credible. He questioned the U.S. authorities’ legal authorization since, according
to him, any attempts to transfer client data had to occur within the boundaries
of the legal assistance framework to which both countries had agreed and that
served to protect banking secrecy (e.g., TA, 13 Sept. 2008). Hence, he thought
that the DOJ would not have sufficient political backing from the U.S. govern-
ment to enforce the transfer of data outside the legal assistance framework. If
the DOJ tried to escalate pressure, he was confident that his strategy to inter-
vene politically by directly addressing the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General would have the effect of the DOJ being ‘‘whistled back’’
(GPK, 3298).
Overall, and based on his low-compellingness judgment, Merz saw abso-
lutely no necessity to depart from the legal assistance procedure and to breach
banking secrecy (Weil, 2015: 67). Therefore he merely authorized additional
human resources to speed up the legal assistance process but considered a
data transfer based on an emergency decree, as proposed by FINMA, to be
absolutely ‘‘out of [the] question’’ (GPK, 3308).
Episode 1 (Phase b): Hostage takers’ intensification of indirect compel-
lence pressure and targets’ compliance with hostage takers’ institutional
demands. By the end of November 2008 no data file had been transferred, so
the U.S. authorities started to intensify their coercive pressure. First, they
repeated their threat to indict UBS should the data not be delivered (Ha¨ssig,
2010: 14), and in December 2008 they gave the Swiss targets an ultimatum for
delivery by the end of the year (NYT, 27 Jan. 2008). Second, they substantiated
their threats by indicting Raoul Weil, head of the UBS private banking division
and member of the bank’s top management team, who was arrested while on
a trip in Italy and extradited to the U.S. Moreover, in the publicized indictment
letter, a number of ‘‘unnamed co-conspirators’’ were mentioned who would be
the next to be indicted, and purportedly these would be CEO Marcel Rohner
and Peter Kurer, chairman of the bank’s supervisory board (NYT, 13 Nov.
2008).
After the DOJ’s escalation, members of UBS—the third parties—drastically
increased the intensity of their petitions directed at Federal Councilor Merz and
other top-level representatives of the Swiss Federal Department of Finance to
comply with the DOJ demands so that an indictment of UBS would be averted
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and the bank would be released from its ‘‘miserable’’ position. The highest-
ranking representatives of UBS, including the chairman of the board, the CEO,
and the general council, frequently contacted the Federal Councilor, and other
top-level FDF personnel used drastic arguments to highlight the consequences
if the Swiss government would not agree to transfer the data immediately and
outside the protracted legal assistance procedure. An indictment of more top
managers or the bank itself would jeopardize the bank’s viability (GPK, 3332).
They further pointed out that, beyond the effect on the banking sector, a
‘‘grounding’’ of UBS would have dramatic consequences for Switzerland (e.g.,
GPK 3314–3315). They also emphasized that the DOJ had already taken an
uncompromising stance: if the data were not transferred immediately, an
indictment of the bank was imminent.
Given the U.S. escalation and heavy pressure from UBS representatives, in
late November 2008 Federal Councilor Merz, together with Federal Councilor
Evelin Widmer-Schlumpf (head of the Federal Department of Justice and
Police), wrote a letter to their U.S. counterparts articulating their concern about
the U.S. authorities’ attempts to coercively receive data outside the legal assis-
tance process to which both countries had agreed (GPK, 3305). The letter was
not answered (Ha¨ssig, 2010: 144), and in subsequent phone calls the U.S.
secretaries reinforced the DOJ’s request to receive the data by the end of the
year (GPK, 3318). This led Merz to reconsider the situation and change his com-
pellingness assessment of the threat. He continued, as before the escalation,
to assess the threat level as severe. He explicitly considered that an indictment
by the DOJ would jeopardize the bank’s existence and that the consequences
of the bank’s failure would be dramatic for the Swiss economy and financial
system, leading to projected long-term costs of up to 300 billion Swiss francs
(USD 300 billion) (Federal Council, 19 Feb. 2009). But the escalation now led
Merz to consider the threat as credible, too. Merz recognized that the U.S.
authorities would not respect the bilateral agreements and Swiss sovereignty
and that they would rather draw their legal authorization from the unilateral
application of U.S. law (SRF documentary, 2014). Moreover, like UBS’s top
managers, Merz now came to assess the U.S. authorities as highly deter-
mined, not least because the DOJ was highly impatient and relentless (TA, 20
Feb. 2009). Merz informed his six fellow Federal Councilors about his request
to transfer the data by means of an emergency decree. Ueli Maurer, the repre-
sentative of the nationalist SVP, categorically objected to any attempts to
undermine Swiss banking secrecy law, but the other five Federal Councilors
(two socialist and three neoliberal politicians) supported the request (GPK,
3317).
Thus in early December 2008, Merz complied with the DOJ’s demands to
suspend central tenets of banking secrecy and agreed to authorize the transfer
of the requested client data by means of an emergency decree to avert UBS’s
likely indictment and the grave consequences. From early 2009 onward, 4,400
client dossiers were delivered to U.S. authorities so they could identify and
penalize U.S. tax evaders. In turn, the DOJ offered UBS a deferred prosecution
agreement (DOJ, 18 Feb. 2009). In a subsequent press conference, Merz
announced that the pressure of the U.S. authorities had led to this ‘‘unique
case’’ but that banking secrecy would be maintained (Federal Council, 19 Feb.
2009). Behind the scenes, however, it was clear that this measure constituted
a ‘‘grave infringement’’ of Swiss banking secrecy (Federal Councilor Pascal
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Couchepin, FDP); ‘‘it showed that the banking secrecy is not immortal, it can
be cracked if there is enough pressure’’ (Daniel Zuberbu¨hler, head of Swiss
legal authority, SRF documentary, 2014). In the eyes of Swiss authorities and
commentators, the bank had been taken ‘‘hostage’’ by the DOJ in order to
compromise Swiss banking secrecy and receive the requested data (Landmann
and Zeyer, 2013: 1; NZZ, 4 Feb. 2012; TA, 21 July 2011).
Episode 2: Threatening Legal Sanctions against 12 More Swiss Banks and
Effecting the Erosion of Swiss Banking Secrecy (2009–2015)
In April 2011, based on revelations made in a voluntary disclosure program,
DOJ representatives announced that they were targeting other Swiss banks
for transgressions similar to those of UBS. Among the 12 targeted banks were
Credit Suisse, which was almost as large as UBS, and Bank Wegelin, the old-
est Swiss bank, as well as Swiss cantonal banks with a state guarantee and
several other prominent banks. Via the media, DOJ representatives repeatedly
announced that they expected to gain access to data on U.S. tax evaders with
Swiss bank accounts, as they had done in the UBS case. Their eventual target
would be to reach a ‘‘global solution’’ with the purpose of disclosing as many
cases as possible of U.S. citizens who held untaxed Swiss accounts. Just as
UBS had, the banks announced their willingness to cooperate fully with the
DOJ and to transfer the requested client data if the Swiss government gave
the necessary permissions.
As Federal Councilor Merz had retired in 2010, the issue was taken over by
his successor as head of the Federal Department of Finance, Federal Councilor
Widmer-Schlumpf. Like Merz, Widmer-Schlumpf was a representative of a
neoliberal, business-friendly party (BDP), and like Merz she had witnessed first-
hand the U.S. authorities’ determination to do whatever was required to access
data on U.S. tax evaders. Her position was that another breach of the Swiss
law through emergency measures, as in the UBS case, must not happen. Thus
in August 2011 she proposed to the DOJ that Switzerland could extend the
administrative assistance procedure in place between Switzerland and the U.S.
at the time, but with an amendment. This would allow the DOJ to file ‘‘group
enquiries’’ whereby Switzerland would accept U.S. requests for administrative
assistance if they included a detailed and credible description of active, culpable
conduct by a given bank or its employees. The existing agreement made provi-
sion for administrative assistance only in single cases, that is, if the foreign
country delivered evidence of individual tax fraud. The aim was to provide the
DOJ sufficient legal and administrative support for gaining the requisite data
more quickly and easily. Obviously, this would weaken and erode Swiss bank-
ing secrecy. Although the DOJ noted that it would potentially accept a ‘‘global
solution’’ based on the path of administrative assistance, a main hurdle was
that this amendment had to be approved by the Swiss parliament in a legisla-
tive procedure during its autumn session in September 2011.
Episode 2 (Phase a): Targets’ resistance to hostage takers’ institutional
demands. The U.S. authorities more or less immediately approached the
Swiss government with an ultimatum. In a highly publicized letter to the Swiss
Federal Department of Finance in August 2011, the U.S. Attorney General and
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the Deputy Attorney General jointly emphasized that if the requested data were
not transferred by the end of the year, banks would be indicted (e.g., NYT, 5
Sept. 2011).
Following the ultimatum, petitions from the threatened banks directed at the
Swiss government were still moderate. Representatives of the banks
approached Swiss parliamentarians regularly to ensure that they would agree
to the amendment so that indictments would be avoided (Urs Schwaller, CVP,
Swiss parliament, 23 Sept. 2011). Pointing to the compellingness of the ultima-
tum, they highlighted the severity and credibility of the DOJ’s threat. They
emphasized that delays or a rejection of the amendment would lead to an esca-
lation of the interstate conflict and that this would carry serious risks (NZZ, 21
Sept. 2011).
Swiss parliamentarians disagreed about whether the threat from U.S.
authorities was both severe and credible. Representatives of the two socialist
parties, SP and GDP, regarded the threat as very compelling and judged the
consequences if the DOJ were to follow through with the threat as very
severe. They regarded Switzerland as more dependent on the survival of the
threatened banks than on banking secrecy, which they regarded as leading to
injustices and which they wished to give up in any case (Fetz, SP, Swiss parlia-
ment, 23 Sept. 2011). They also regarded the threat as highly credible: since
the Swiss banks had behaved irresponsibly and transgressed U.S. law, U.S.
authorities would have the legal authorization to indict the banks (Berberat, SP,
Swiss parliament, 23 Sept. 2011). They saw the U.S. authorities as highly
determined and believed that resisting their demands would lead to an escala-
tion of the conflict.
In contrast, the neoliberal parties (BDP, CVP, FDP, GLP) assessed the threat
as not compelling enough to warrant action. Similar to the socialists, they
regarded the threat as very severe, acknowledging that the U.S. authorities
‘‘have in their assortment torture tools, from the thumbscrew to the deadly gar-
rote’’ and that one would need to make sure they did not apply them (Frick,
CVP, Swiss parliament, 23 Sept. 2011). One would also need to ‘‘recognize the
imminent danger for the Swiss economy’’ if the U.S. were to follow through
and indict banks that were systematically important for Switzerland (Marty,
FDP, 23 Sept. 2011). Yet they interpreted the threat not as overly credible,
believing that U.S. authorities would respect the bilateral agreements in place
between the countries. Hence they believed that if the Swiss parliament post-
poned its decision, the U.S. authorities would recognize and accept that the
parliament in a proper democratic rule-of-law state like Switzerland or the U.S.
itself requires sufficient time for deliberation to gain a proper understanding of
what this amendment was about (Brinner, FDP, 23 Sept. 2011).
The nationalists also judged the threat as not sufficiently compelling, albeit
for different reasons. Unlike the socialists and neoliberals, SVP politicians did
not consider the threat as sufficiently severe. As Ueli Maurer, Federal
Councilor and a leading SVP politician, remarked, the party would be willing to
let a bank go ‘‘bust’’ rather than sacrifice Swiss laws and the legal stability of
the Swiss financial market. Banking secrecy was an elementary aspect of
Switzerland’s national identity that the SVP would strive to defend by all means
(Sonntag, 14 Sept. 2011). They also regarded the threat as not sufficiently cred-
ible; they did not think that U.S. authorities would put their power before Swiss
law and sovereignty (e.g., Reimann, SVP, 23 Sept. 2011).
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Thus only the socialist policy makers voted in favor of the amendment,
meaning the majority of parliamentarians voted to delay the decision about the
amendment until the parliamentary session of March 2012. Thus the Swiss
government’s compliance with the hostage takers’ demands in this phase was
low.
Episode 2 (Phase b): Hostage takers’ intensification of indirect compel-
lence pressure and targets’ compliance with hostage takers’ institutional
demands. After the Swiss parliament postponed making this decision, the
DOJ drastically escalated its coercive pressure. To reinforce the ultimatum
already in place, it engaged in a series of intimidating measures. In November
2011, the DOJ indicted several Swiss bankers, including seven Credit Suisse
bankers—one of them a senior manager of the private banking division—one
Julius Ba¨r client advisor, and three Wegelin bankers (Blick, 13 Oct. 2011; NYT,
4 Jan. 2012). In January 2012, the DOJ threatened and subsequently indicted
Bank Wegelin (FT, 6 Mar. 2012). Within less than two weeks the bank was
forced to close down. Wegelin was accused of ‘‘conspiring with U.S. taxpayers
and others to hide more than 1.2 billion USD in secret accounts and the income
these accounts generated’’ (DOJ, 2 Feb. 2012). Founded in 1741, Wegelin was
Switzerland’s oldest bank and one of its most traditional and prestigious private
banks, and Konrad Hummler, its anti-U.S. and pro-banking-secrecy CEO, was
the chair of the Swiss private banking association. The bank was relatively
small, so its failure would be relatively inconsequential for the global financial
system. One of the U.S. authorities, quoted anonymously early in January 2012
in the Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung (NZZ), Switzerland’s largest newspaper, under-
scored that as the Swiss parliamentarians’ deliberations concerning the amend-
ment would soon begin again, the DOJ intended these indictments to function
as a signal to Bern (the Swiss capital and seat of parliament). The DOJ would
have little patience and would be suspicious of actions that could be classified
as further delays. DOJ officials were convinced that only the application of
massive pressure on Switzerland would lead to the desired results and thus to
the swift transfer of the data on U.S. tax evaders (NZZ, 4 Jan. 2012).
The indictment of Wegelin sent a ‘‘shockwave’’ through the Swiss banking
sector, as this was the first time ever that U.S. authorities had indicted a for-
eign bank (Swissinfo, 2012). In the following weeks, top managers of the
affected banks published several commentaries in the major Swiss newspa-
pers, and when they approached Swiss parliamentarians on a daily basis the
bankers dramatized the consequences of indictments, emphasizing that com-
pliance with U.S. demands was a question of life and death for the banks and
the Swiss economy as well (TA, 20 Jan. 2012). The Wegelin indictment was a
‘‘warning shot’’ (SRF, 3 Feb. 2012).
The U.S. escalation as well as intense influencing activities by the banks led
many Swiss parliamentarians to change their interpretations and responses.
The majority now regarded the threat as not only severe but also highly credible
and thus decided to comply with the coercers’ demands. As before, the social-
ist parties saw the threat to indict the banks as compelling and thus overwhel-
mingly voted for the amendment. Hence their compellingness judgments were
reinforced and not qualitatively changed by the escalation.
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The judgments of the neoliberal party members, who had previously voted
against the amendment, were clearly affected by the escalation. While they
had already regarded the threat as highly severe, they now emphasized the
consequences of the threat for the banks and for Switzerland in a more pro-
nounced way, highlighting that a DOJ indictment constituted a threat to a
bank’s very existence (Mu¨ller, FDP, FW, 10 Feb. 2012), which, given the size
of the threatened banks, held negative consequences for the entire Swiss
economy (Hassler, CVP, Swiss parliament, 29 Feb. 2012). Most importantly,
the escalation led them to reconsider the credibility of the threat. As the indict-
ment of Wegelin had shown, the DOJ would be willing and able to breach the
bilateral agreements and unilaterally apply U.S. law, and it would also be
unscrupulous and ready to escalate further (NZZ, 4 Feb. 2012). Hence the neo-
liberal party members came to consider it as their duty to step in and release
the banks from their ‘‘miserable’’ position.
Only members of the nationalist party, SVP, once again opted against the
amendment because they did not regard the threat as compelling. The escala-
tion had an effect in that some nationalists now regarded the threat as credible,
emphasizing and decrying the unilateral legal approach of the DOJ (Stamm,
SVP, Swiss parliament, 5 Mar. 2012), which suggests they now regarded the
DOJ as able and willing to follow through with its threats. Others, however, still
questioned the DOJ’s determination, doubting that U.S. authorities would dare
to indict a large Swiss bank (Germann, SVP, TA, 6 Feb. 2012). And party mem-
bers still regarded the threat as not sufficiently severe to warrant the amend-
ment. Once again, they argued that sacrificing banking secrecy would be
worse than sacrificing threatened banks and that it would create more instabil-
ity for the Swiss financial sector than agreeing to the amendment (NZZ, 6 Feb.
2012). According to its policy document, the ‘‘SVP rejects the amendment of
the bilateral agreement with the US, as it weakens Switzerland’s banking cen-
ter and endangers jobs’’ (Reimann, SVP, 11 Mar. 2012, blog). They subse-
quently launched another initiative to include the institution in the Swiss
constitution (Swiss parliament, 21 Nov. 2012).
Overall, and contrary to the first phase of this episode, the majority in the
Swiss parliament considered the threat sufficiently compelling to warrant
action and opted in March 2012 to comply with the DOJ demands to pass the
amendment. According to many, this decision marked the end of Swiss bank-
ing secrecy (e.g., WSJ, 6 Mar. 2012). Subsequently, the DOJ developed a
‘‘global solution’’ program for the data transfer. As a DOJ official announced in
September 2012, ‘‘this enforcement effort has dealt fabled Swiss bank secrecy
a devastating blow and provided tools that should yield information on thou-
sands of additional U.S. offshore account holders who have undisclosed
accounts at UBS and other banks.’’ On the Swiss side, the drastic law enforce-
ment actions of the U.S. authorities contributed to the announcement of a
‘‘white money strategy’’ as a new, radically different policy aimed at generally
keeping untaxed money away from the Swiss financial sector.
TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF INDIRECT COMPELLENCE
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
As both episodes of our case study testify, what we came to refer to as ‘‘indi-
rect compellence’’ was a critical influence that prompted Swiss policy makers
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and state leaders to change Swiss banking secrecy rules and comply with the
demands of the U.S. authorities. Indirect compellence is a novel type of indirect
coercion based on the hostage taker’s (here, the U.S. authorities’) threat to
sanction a hostage (the Swiss bankers and banks) unless the actual target
(Swiss authorities) complies with the hostage taker’s demands. More gener-
ally, it is a distinct triadic dynamic in which the third party (the hostage) may
become a tertius miserabilis—a third who suffers rather than benefits from
the conflict between the two other actors in the triad (Scharmann, 1959).
Here, we develop a constructivist framework to explain under which condi-
tions indirect compellence leads to institutional change (or not). Table 4 shows
the aggregate dimensions of the data structure we derived inductively and how
these are represented in the two episodes and four phases of our case. These
dimensions constitute the key variables for our constructivist theory.
Variables Explaining the Relationship of Indirect Compellence to
Institutional Change
Intensity of indirect compellence attempts by hostage takers. First, our
analysis focuses on the intensity of indirect compellence attempts mobilized by
the hostage takers (i.e., the U.S. authorities and in particular the DOJ). We con-
ceptualize indirect compellence attempts as involving two types of coercive
activities: indirect threats and indirect intimidations. Indirect compellence
attempts are of high intensity if the hostage taker mobilizes indirect threats of
high magnitude as well as indirect intimidations with high substantiation.
Table 4. Representation of Derived Concepts in Episodes and Phases
Aggregate dimensions and second-order themes Episode 1(a) Episode 1(b) Episode 2(a) Episode 2(b)
Hostage Takers
Intensity of indirect compellence attempts Low High Low High
Magnitude of indirect threats High High High High
Substantiation of indirect intimidations Low High Low High
Hostages
Intensity of compliance petitions Low High Low High
Status of petitioners Low High Low High
Vividness of petitions Low High Low High
Targets*
Perceived compellingness of indirect threat Low High Low High
Perceived severity of indirect threat High High High High
Perceived credibility of indirect threat Low High Low High
Compliance with hostage takers’ demands Low High Low High
* An aggregated view on targeted policy makers’ judgments and responses. The aggregation mechanism in
Episode 1 is the hierarchical decision making of the responsible Federal Council; for Episode 2 it is the
parliamentary vote.
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Indirect threats. Our findings suggest that hostage takers communicate
threats to sanction the hostage unless the target complies with the hostage
takers’ demands—conceptualized here as indirect threats of variable magnitude
(see Horai and Tedeschi, 1969). In our case, the hostage takers consistently
mobilized indirect threats of high magnitude by announcing the intention to
apply highly painful sanctions against the hostage. Throughout all episodes and
phases, the DOJ threatened to indict and thus more or less to ‘‘kill’’ the Swiss
banks it had captured (UBS in Episode 1; Credit Suisse and 11 other banks in
Episode 2). Counterfactually, as regulators, the DOJ could have mobilized indi-
rect threats of lower magnitude by announcing less painful sanctions such as
financial penalties against the banks that do not constitute a form of ‘‘corporate
capital punishment’’ (e.g., Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham, 2010).
Indirect intimidations. We suggest that it is not only through indirect threats,
independently of how painful the announced sanctions are, that hostage takers
develop coercive pressure but also through indirect intimidations (see also
Borowsky, 2011). These are symbolic actions aimed at demonstrating to the target
that not only are the means available for sanctioning the hostages, but the hostage
taker is ready and willing to pay the costs that sanctioning the hostage implies
(see Raven, 1992). We suggest differentiating indirect intimidations according to
their degree of substantiation. Intimidating messages, such as U.S. authorities’
emotional tirades (Raven, 1992) that they were willing to do whatever it took to
crack banking secrecy (Episode 1a), are categorized as indirect intimidations with
lower levels of substantiation. In contrast, we refer to legal enforcement actions
such as the indictments of top-level UBS bankers (in Episode 1b) and of Bank
Wegelin (in Episode 2b) as indirect intimidations with high substantiation.
Intensity of compliance petitions by hostages. In line with research on
hostage taking (Antokol and Nudell, 1990; Buhite, 1995), our study suggests
that hostages may not just be passive resources or pawns in the political game
between hostage takers and targets. Rather, they may try to implore the target
to comply with the demands of the hostage taker so that the hostage taker
achieves its instrumental aims and releases the hostages from their miserable
position.6 We refer to such activity as ‘‘compliance petitions.’’ Our data sug-
gest that the intensity of compliance petitions varies depending on characteris-
tics both of the sender of the petition (i.e., the status of the actor who
petitions; Halperin et al., 1976) and of the petition itself, including the frequency
and emotionality (Hamilton, Hunter, and Burgoon, 1990), which make it more
or less ‘‘vivid.’’ Hence we consider compliance petitions as highly intense if
high-ranking representatives (e.g., a CEO) of the threatened Swiss banks (espe-
cially from the largest ones) frequently use drastic, emotional language when
imploring Swiss policy makers to comply with DOJ demands—see Episodes
1(b) and 2(b).
6 Hostages may also try to influence the coercers to release them from their miserable position.
Though our data show that the Swiss banks also tried to negotiate with the DOJ, because our
theory is target-focused, we did not systematically track these negotiations. Moreover, the escala-
tory pressure that the DOJ put on the Swiss authorities suggests that the hostages were not very
effective in this regard. This is in line with research on hostage taking, which suggests that instru-
mental hostage takers (as opposed to expressive ones) are rarely persuaded to release their hos-
tages if they do not receive concessions from their targets (e.g., Buhite, 1995; Borowsky, 2011).
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Perceived compellingness of an indirect threat by targeted policy
makers. Our findings suggest that compellingness judgments by targeted pol-
icy makers involve two dimensions: the perceived severity of the indirect threat
and its perceived credibility.
Perceived severity of indirect threat. As a first dimension, the target judges
whether the indirect threat is severe and thus whether the sanctions threat-
ened are undesirable to the extent that they warrant action (Anderson, 2011).
As our case shows, such severity judgments have two components: policy
makers’ perception of their country’s dependence on the survival of the threat-
ened hostage (i.e., the banks) and on maintaining the institution that the hos-
tage taker seeks to change (i.e., banking secrecy). The former is positively
related and the latter negatively related to targets’ perceived severity of an indi-
rect threat.
As our case suggests, targeted policy makers’ perception of their country’s
dependence on the survival of the threatened hostages involves two aspects.
First, it involves the target’s judgments on whether their country is (materially
or immaterially) dependent on the hostages. In our case, especially the socialist
policy makers (in Episode 2) and neoliberal policymakers (in Episodes 1 and 2)
came to such a conclusion. Second, it also involves their judgments of whether
the hostage taker has sufficient direct coercive power over the hostage to actu-
ally jeopardize the hostage’s survival. In our case, this capacity of the DOJ was
undisputed across Swiss political parties, as the policy makers seemed to
agree that Swiss banks might not survive an indictment by the DOJ. As for
maintaining the institution, targeted policy makers’ severity judgments also
involve perceptions of whether their country is (materially or immaterially)
dependent on maintaining the institution that the hostage takers seek to
change, a dimension that was important especially to the nationalist policy
makers because they considered banking secrecy an integral part of
Switzerland’s national identity.
Overall, targeted policy makers’ severity judgments involve a weighting of
these two components (Buhite, 1995; Lamond, 2010). Hereby, perceived
severity is high (or low) if policy makers regard their country to be more (or
less) dependent on the survival of the hostage than on maintaining the institu-
tional status quo. We argue that perceptions of high severity are a necessary
condition for indirect threats leading to institutional change.
Perceived credibility of indirect threat. The compellingness judgments of tar-
geted policy makers also involve their interpretation of whether the indirect
threat is credible and thus of whether the hostage taker will follow through
with the sanctions directed at the hostage if the target fails to comply with the
hostage takers’ demands. We argue that perceptions of high credibility are a
sufficient condition for indirect threats leading to institutional change. Based on
our data, we propose that targets’ assessments of the credibility depend on
targets’ impression of the hostage takers (Goffman, 1959; Schimmelfennig,
2002; Jasper, 2006) and specifically of their determination and authorization.
Judgments of the hostage takers’ determination hinge on the targets’
assessments of whether the hostage takers will be ready and willing to sanc-
tion the third parties if the targets do not comply. Toward that end, interpreta-
tions of the degree of hostage takers’ resolve—i.e., whether the hostage
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takers have ‘‘the temperamental inclination to make every possible effort
to carry out [their] intention’’ (Goffman, 1971: 103)—as well as of their
ruthlessness—whether hostage takers are likely to restrict their sanctioning of
hostages (low ruthlessness) or whether they are actually ‘‘prepared to use the
most extreme form of coercion’’ against hostages (high ruthlessness) (Raven,
1992: 224)—played a critical role in all four phases of our two episodes.
Targets’ judgments of the authorization of hostage takers involve their
assessments of whether hostage takers are ‘‘entitled’’ to sanction the hos-
tages (Wolf, 2005: 212). In this regard, targets’ assessments of whether hos-
tage takers were ‘‘in authority,’’ and thus whether they were formally entitled
to follow through with the threatened sanctions (Wolf, 2005: 213), were critical.
Being in authority derives from a formal position (Weber, 1978; Crozier and
Friedberg, 1980) and is based on the power to execute the law that, in this
case, is granted by a legal mandate (see Prakash, 2003). In our case, targeted
policy makers’ authorization judgments centered on their interpretations of
whether the DOJ had a legal mandate to indict Swiss banks or not.
A Constructivist Theory of Indirect Compellence and Institutional Change
Having introduced the key component variables, we now introduce our con-
structivist theory of indirect compellence and national institutional change. As
detailed in the introduction, constructivist research on coercion rests on two
assumptions (e.g., Bell, 2012; Bell and Hindmoor, 2015): first, that coercion is
best understood from the perspective of the target and, second, that codified
ideas, like political ideologies, play a major role in how targets arrive at their
interpretations and respond to coercive pressure. Our theory builds on these
assumptions in separate sections.
A target-centered perspective on indirect compellence and institutional
change. Figure 2 provides a rationale for explaining under which conditions
indirect compellence leads to compliance and thus to changes in national insti-
tutions. First, it suggests that targeted policy makers may comply with the
demands of hostage takers only if they judge the hostage takers’ indirect
threats as compelling and thus as highly severe (necessary condition) and
highly credible (sufficient condition) to warrant changing the institutional status
quo (Buhite, 1995; Anderson, 2011). Under such conditions, the targets regard
the survival of the hostage to be worth more than the concessions (i.e., the
institutional changes) that the hostage taker demands (perceived high severity),
and they regard the hostage taker to be sufficiently determined and authorized
to follow through with the threatened sanctions against the hostage (perceived
high credibility). As a result of this judgment process, the target decides to
release the hostage from its tertius miserabilis (Scharmann, 1959) position by
complying with the hostage takers’ demands.
Second, our theory proposes that the intensity of hostage takers’ indirect
compellence attempts influences targeted policy makers’ judgments in two
ways. The first way is that the magnitude of hostage takers’ indirect threats
predominantly influences targeted policy makers’ severity judgments, but indi-
rect threats of high magnitude are interpreted as severe only if the target
regards the survival of the hostage (as jeopardized by an indirect threat of
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highly painful sanctions) as worth more than maintaining the institutional status
quo. Otherwise the target will not regard the consequences of the indirect
threat as sufficiently severe to warrant compliance with the hostage takers’
demands in order to rescue the hostage. The second way is that the degree of
substantiation of hostage takers’ indirect intimidations predominantly influ-
ences the targets’ credibility judgments: targets tend to consider indirect
threats with high degrees of substantiation as highly credible. By mobilizing inti-
midations with high substantiation, hostage takers can set an example, as the
DOJ did by indicting Bank Wegelin. Setting an example involves the demon-
strative or symbolic use of force against the hostage: ‘‘just enough force of an
appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat
that greater force will be used if necessary’’ (George, 1991: 10).
Third, as far as the relationship between the compliance petitions of the hos-
tages and targets’ indirect compellingness judgments is concerned, the compli-
ance petitions have a smaller impact on the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness)
of indirect compellence. Rather, such petitions have an additive effect on tar-
gets’ judgments, contributing to the coercive pressure developed by the hos-
tage takers.7 The intensity of hostages’ compliance petitions appears to
primarily influence targets’ credibility judgments. The reason seems to be that
hostages provide the hostage takers with ‘‘impression management support’’
(Westphal et al., 2012: 217)—especially if the representative of the hostage
has high status and frequently mobilizes emotional petitions—thus contributing
to the impression that targeted policy makers form about the hostage taker’s
readiness to sanction the hostage if the target fails to comply. As far as the
influence of compliance petitions on severity judgments is concerned, they
seem to reinforce rather than qualitatively change the targets’ judgments.
The mediating role of targeted policy makers’ political ideologies. Table
5 shows how policy makers with different political ideologies responded to the
7 In classic hostage-taking scenarios, hostage takers frequently do not allow hostages to contact
the target or allow them to do so only in prescribed and limited ways (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986;
Buhite, 1995).
Figure 2. Constructivist theory of indirect compellence and institutional change.
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indirect threats to Swiss banks. As the second episode of our case shows,
Swiss policy makers interpreted and responded to indirect compellence pres-
sure in fairly different ways. To explain why, we build on constructivist argu-
ments that policy makers’ political ideologies mediate how they perceive and
respond to coercive pressure (Bell, 2012; Bell and Hindmoor, 2015).
Socialists. The socialists were early compliers. Influenced by an ideology
that emphasizes the merits of an equal and just society (Rawls, 1971) and the
need for international collaboration and transnational governance (Jackson,
2014), they regarded the threat as compelling already in Episode 2(a). For them,
the threat was severe because they considered the survival of the hostages
more important than the maintenance of the institution; they regarded it as
unfair for ordinary Swiss taxpayers to have to pay the cost should the banks
collapse, and they objected to banking secrecy due to its purported effect on
national and global injustices. They also considered the threat as credible. They
regarded the DOJ as authorized to act against the Swiss banks, whose conduct
they saw as irresponsible, and also as sufficiently determined to not be
deterred by the bilateral agreements and their specific wording. The intensifica-
tion of the influencing attempts by hostage takers and hostages in Episode 2(b)
did not change but only reinforced their judgments.
Nationalists. Policy makers with a nationalist ideology that values the pro-
tection of national identity and sovereignty (Vincent, 2014) were steadfast res-
isters. They regarded the threat as neither severe nor credible. For them, the
targeted institution was an integral and sacrosanct part of Switzerland’s
national heritage and identity. They were thus prepared to let the hostages go
bust rather than comply with the hostage takers’ demands. Regarding credibil-
ity, the bilateral agreement did not have a value in and of itself for the national-
ists, but they saw it as a means to secure Swiss sovereignty. Hence they did
not regard the DOJ to have the authorization and determination to act unilater-
ally and indict Swiss banks. While the increased intensity of the hostage takers’
Table 5. Effects of Ideological Differences of Targeted Policy Makers on Their Interpretation
and Response to the Indirect Threat
Aggregate dimensions and
second-order themes Episode 1(a) Episode 1(b) Episode 2(a) Episode 2(b)
Perceived compellingness
of indirect threat
Neoliberal: low Neoliberal: high Socialist: high
Neoliberal: low
Nationalist: low
Socialist: high
Neoliberal: high
Nationalist: low
Perceived severity
of indirect threat
Neoliberal: high Neoliberal: high Socialist: high
Neoliberal: high
Nationalist: low
Socialist: high
Neoliberal: high
Nationalist: low
Perceived credibility
of indirect threat
Neoliberal: low Neoliberal: high Socialist: high
Neoliberal: low
Nationalist: low
Socialist: high
Neoliberal: high
Nationalist: high
Compliance with hostage
takers’ demands
Neoliberal: low Neoliberal: high Socialist: high
Neoliberal: low
Nationalist: low
Socialist: high
Neoliberal: high
Nationalist: low
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and the hostages’ influencing attempts changed their credibility assessments,
their perceptions of severity (and thus their overall compellingness assess-
ments) remained widely constant.8
Neoliberals. Policy makers with a neoliberal ideology that emphasizes the
primacy of the economy as a means for both individual development and
national welfare (Centeno and Cohen, 2012) were late compliers. Initially, they
considered the threat severe but not credible. Even though they attested to
banking secrecy’s considerable importance because it would protect the free-
dom of individuals from excessive state intervention and because it would
contribute to a competitive advantage for Switzerland, they considered it subor-
dinate to the survival of those Swiss banks they considered too big to fail. But
because neoliberalism emphasizes strict compliance with rules (Hayek, 1944:
191), they initially did not regard the U.S. authorities to have sufficient authori-
zation and determination to transgress the bilateral treaty in place between the
countries and to enforce U.S. law extraterritorially. They came to regard the
threat as credible only after the intensification of hostage takers’ and hostages’
influence activities in Episode 2(b). This dynamic was similar to the judgments
of the neoliberal Federal Councilor Merz in Episode 1.
Generalizability of the Theoretical Framework
As far as the generalizability of our theory is concerned, our framework sug-
gests that international coercers’ use of indirect compellence may be particu-
larly effective in inducing targeted policy makers to change national institutions
if they judge their country as more dependent on the survival of the hostage
than on maintaining the institutional status quo. This may especially be the case
if the hostages are large financial services companies. Because of the financial
sector’s connection with a country’s economy, some financial service compa-
nies may be interpreted by targeted policy makers as being too big to fail (Bell,
2012; Culpepper, 2015), like UBS and Credit Suisse in our case, thus making
them ideal hostages. Still, other types of companies, industries, or sectors may
be judged as being of utmost importance to a certain country, too. These may
include the oil and gas sector in several OPEC countries (Abdelal, 2015), the
automotive sector in Germany (Rhodes, 2016), mining companies in Australia
(Bell and Hindmoor, 2014), or other firms and sectors that provide essential
products or services to the population or government of a targeted country.
Also, for indirect compellence to work, the targets must believe that the hos-
tage taker has the sanctioning capacity necessary for jeopardizing the survival
of a hostage on which the target depends. The DOJ’s sanctioning capacity was
undisputed in our case. Yet other foreign actors may have significant leverage
over domestic firms and sectors, including policy makers in large economies or
supranational constellations such as the European Union. Threatening to block
the access of foreign companies to these markets, especially if these consti-
tute the primary destination of their exports, may give a potential hostage taker
8 Although our data do not provide supportive evidence, it is of course possible that the nationalists
maintained their position of steadfast resistance due to their expectations that the other parties
would comply and save the banks. Even if this were the case, however, our data still show general
tendencies of nationalist policy makers to resist the threats and emphasize the important role of
the nationalists’ ideology in mediating their perceptions and responses.
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leverage to influence governmental actors in target countries when threatening
to sanction companies from such countries.
As far as our theoretical extension is concerned, we are not suggesting that
it is applicable only to settings in which policy makers have these three ideolo-
gies or that policy makers with these three ideologies will react similarly to indi-
rect compellence attempts irrespective of the type of hostages involved and
the types of concessions that hostage takers demand. Rather, the extension
offers two key takeaways. First, attending to political ideologies matters in
understanding (indirect) international coercion in general (Henisz, Zelner, and
Guille´n, 2005) and indirect compellence in particular, because ideologies influ-
ence targeted policy makers’ judgments of severity and credibility and mediate
how they respond to influencing attempts by hostage takers and hostages.
Second, understanding national-level targets of indirect compellence as unitary
actors who respond to influencing attempts in a monolithic way may be suit-
able for exceptional cases (e.g., authoritarian states) but not for democracies in
which the government is composed of policy makers with different political
ideologies. Hence we expect our extension to have a wide scope.
Overall, indirect compellence is not feasible in every case of international
coercion. Still, this mechanism deserves to be studied systematically as it
appears to occur frequently not only in international institutional settings but
also in domestic ones. For instance, and as cases of ‘‘bossnapping’’ in France
testify (e.g., Parsons, 2013), indirect compellence also appears to be part of the
tactical repertoire of some radical social movements.9 Moreover, it may also be
frequently employed by multinational companies when, for example, they
threaten to lay off employees unless government changes the institutional envi-
ronment to their liking (e.g., Hay, 2002: 202–204).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we have shown how and why indirect compellence repeatedly
enabled U.S. authorities, as coercers, to induce Swiss policy makers to adapt
and erode the institution of Swiss banking secrecy. Based on our findings, we
developed a constructivist theory on indirect compellence in international insti-
tutional environments. Our theory gives primacy to targeted policy makers’ and
state leaders’ judgments of this type of coercive pressure. It emphasizes that
the judgments of targeted actors vary and that, depending on their political
ideologies, their judgments are influenced to a different degree by the influen-
cing attempts that the coercers and the hostages may mobilize to induce the
policy makers to comply with the coercers’ demands.
Contributions to Research on Triadic Relationships
In addition to suggesting a novel mechanism of indirect coercion that could be
explored in other contexts, by other actors, and on other levels (Henisz, Zelner,
and Guille´n, 2005; see also Gargiulo, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Frooman,
1999; King and Soule, 2007), our analysis of indirect compellence also contri-
butes to the scholarly understanding of power and influence in triadic relations
9 In the case of ‘‘bossnapping,’’ workers detain managers—essentially taking them as hostages—
to press for better working conditions or to protest against layoffs.
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more generally. Following Simmel’s (1950) influential lead, extant research has
focused on triadic relationships in which the third party is in an independent
and thus relatively powerful position. Simmel portrayed this type of third party
either as a third who has the power to connect two other, unconnected actors
in the triad or to increase their connection (tertius iungens), as a third who has
the power to benefit from the ongoing conflict or competition of two others
(tertius gaudens), or as a third who benefits from creating such conflict in the
first place (divide et impera). Simmel’s conception of these three tertius roles
has been foundational for research on brokerage on various levels of analysis
(e.g., Burt, 1995; Obstfeld, 2005; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery,
2009; Obstfeld, Borgatti, and Davis, 2014; Halevy, Halali, and Zlatev, 2019), and
his conception of the tertius gaudens has also inspired research on indirect
coercion in transnational institutional settings (Henisz, Zelner, and Guille´n,
2005).
In contrast, our conceptualization of indirect compellence suggests that the
third party can also become a hostage, thus occupying a much less indepen-
dent and powerful position in the triad. In a way, this type of third party thus
becomes a tertius miserabilis, a third who suffers from the conflict of two other
actors (Scharmann, 1959). As part of his largely unnoticed critique of Simmel’s
(1950) influential treatise, the German sociologist Theodor Scharmann (1959)
offered this concept as a complementary figure to Simmel’s third party (and
specifically to the tertius gaudens), as he regarded Simmel’s work as one-sided
and unbalanced. Our study is among the first to give Scharmann’s (1959) cri-
tique conceptual and empirical life. Going forward, and rather than focusing
only on the further elaboration and testing of the powerful tertius roles that
Simmel offered and that current research on brokerage focuses on (see
Halevy, Halali, and Zlatev, 2019, for a review), future research may also more
fully explore other triadic influence mechanisms whereby third parties assume
rather powerless tertius miserabilis roles, including the ‘‘servant of two mas-
ters,’’ the ‘‘bone of discord,’’ or the neglected or outcast third (Scharmann,
1959). This would create a more balanced and complete perspective on power
and influence in triadic relations.
Contributions to Research on Power and Influence in Institutional
Environments
This study also contributes to institutional research on power and influence.
First, our constructivist perspective on indirect compellence adds to research at
the intersection of resource dependence and institutional theory. Most gener-
ally, it emphasizes that resource dependencies are not objectively given but are
socially constructed (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003: 71–88). More specifically,
our study goes beyond extant scholarship on coercion in institutional settings
(e.g., Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Dobbin and
Dowd, 2000; Guler, Guille´n, and Macpherson, 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and
Guille´n, 2005; Guille´n and Capron, 2016), which has predominantly adopted rea-
list measures of resource dependence. This research has implicitly or explicitly
assumed that the target’s de facto dependence on a coercer induces the target
to more or less automatically comply with the coercer’s demands. In contrast,
our study emphasizes the embedded agency of targeted actors facing coercive
pressure of variable intensity. It shows that targets’ responses to a coercer’s
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demands are mediated by ideational factors that guide their interpretations of
the coercers and the dependence relation with them (Bell, 2012; Bell and
Hindmoor, 2015). Depending on these ideational factors, targets of coercion
may thus respond in different ways than realist measures presume (Guzzini,
2013).
Future research may deepen the constructivist perspective on indirect com-
pellence we have suggested. One could also develop target-centered construc-
tivist views on other types of direct and indirect coercion in both national and
transnational institutional settings. Furthermore, one may explore ideational fac-
tors when exploring coercion from the perspective of the coercer to further
deepen our understanding of coercive work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) or,
in the case of indirect coercion, from the perspective of the third party. When
doing so, and as the constructivist perspective is not limited to the political
ideologies that we have focused on in our case (e.g., Campbell, 2002), future
research may also explore other types of ideational factors that organizational
and institutional scholars have focused on, such as professional norms
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), interpretive schemes of expert communities
(Haas, 1992; Djelic and Quack, 2010), or institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio,
and Lounsbury, 2012). This would lead to a better integration of institutional
research on coercion with ideational perspectives, which have evolved largely
separately.
Second, with its detailed analysis of the communication of threats and intimi-
dations in institutional change processes, our study also contributes to research
on how communication leads to power and influence in institutional environ-
ments (Lawrence, 2008; Cornelissen et al., 2015). Focusing predominantly on
rather soft and unobtrusive types of communicative action such as the use of
rhetoric (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), framing (Meyer and Ho¨llerer, 2010),
and stories (Maguire and Hardy, 2009) or rather defensive forms of impression
management (Elsbach, 1994), extant research has paid insufficient attention to
darker, harder, and more assertive types of communicative action and the con-
ditions under which these may enable actors to gain others’ compliance with
or commitment to institutional rules and projects. Recent political develop-
ments and the antagonisms they entail suggest that such tactics may have
become more prevalent and acceptable also in other institutional domains.
Hence there is a crucial need for organizational and institutional scholars to
examine these developments and mechanisms in more depth.
Contributions to Institutional Research on Transnational Business
Regulation
By focusing on extraterritorial law and the transnational influence of govern-
mental authorities, we contribute to institutional research on transnational busi-
ness regulation and global governance. First, while extant research has
predominantly focused on transnational private authorities (e.g., Schneiberg
and Bartley, 2008; Bartley, 2018; Djelic and Quack, 2018) or supranational
governance authorities (e.g., Fligstein, 2005, 2008), our study has foregrounded
the transnational influence of national public authorities. Specifically, we have
emphasized the powerful transnational role of the United States not only in the
diffusion of its culture and management models (Djelic, 1998) and in influencing
transnational organizations and standards based on soft law (Djelic and Quack,
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2008) but also in terms of the transnational effects of its national hard laws.
Future research may also explore extraterritorial law enforcement against for-
eign companies or managers in other issue areas and/or by public authorities
from a number of other countries that ‘‘have demonstrated some capacity and
willingness to regulate extraterritorially’’ (Putnam, 2009: 483; see also
Kacmarek and Newman, 2011). Moreover, scholars should investigate the
interactions of extraterritorial law and other types of transnational institutions
such as transnational standards and certification systems that have been stud-
ied more intensively.
Second, prior institutional research—akin to related streams of literature on
transnational governance (e.g., Halliday and Carruthers, 2007; Vogel, 2008;
Scherer and Palazzo, 2011)—has predominantly focused on transnational insti-
tutions with no clear national origin. This is based on the assumption that
national governance is essentially attached to a state’s geographic territory,
which leads to difficulties when regulating transnational phenomena (Ruggie,
1993). By contrast, our study suggests that this research has been too skepti-
cal with regard to the potential of national governmental authorities to enforce
rules beyond their borders, e.g., on global business firms, transnational actors,
or other state actors. Our focus on (extra)territoriality goes beyond the natura-
lized and thus simplified notion of territory as a given geographic space (see
Agnew, 1994) and draws on the distinction between territory and territoriality
(Raustiala, 2009; Sassen, 2013). Territory can be defined as ‘‘a capability with
embedded logics of power and claim-making’’ (Sassen, 2013: 23), whereas
territoriality (or extraterritoriality) is defined as ‘‘claims of authority . . . that are
made by particular actors with particular substantive interests to promote’’
(Buxbaum, 2009: 635).
This perspective implies two important insights: first, territory is not ontologi-
cally given but is the result of a social construction based on (successful) claims
of authority. Second, territory is not restricted to geographic space but is rather
constituted as a space of social relationships (i.e., an institutional field) with
embedded rules and power logics that create order and establish a border
between the inside and the outside (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Institutional
scholars may feel inspired not only to reassess the role of national authority in
transnational governance and business regulation but to engage in a subtle
analysis of the relationship between jurisdictional and field expansions and the
conditions under which extraterritorial enforcement of national law may shape
or reshape global banking and finance, social media, internet businesses, and
other seemingly ‘‘de-territorialized’’ fields.
Yet our proposed framework is based on a largely positive analysis, leaving
open the question of whether and under what conditions it is normatively justi-
fied to extraterritorially enforce national rules on private or public actors in other
countries to induce institutional change. With regard to the Swiss banking
secrecy rules, the situation is ambivalent and depends on the normative stance
one wants to apply. When considering the consequences, on the one hand,
banking secrecy may have protected the assets of unjustly persecuted people,
e.g., in the case of Jews who were persecuted by the Nazi regime. On the
other hand it has also protected ill-gotten gains, be it for private tax avoiders
(Zucman, 2015) or for dictators who have plundered the resources of their
home countries (Guex, 2000: 265–266). A normative-ethical analysis is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this paper.
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